Het gebruik van Chinese Nuctech-apparatuur door de Nederlandse douane
Als het aan Europese Commissievoorzitter Ursula von der Leyen ligt, wordt het Chinese technologiebedrijf Nuctech uitgesloten van aanbestedingsprocedures in Europa. In haar reactie op een brief van Bart Groothuis stelt ze dat veiligheid boven prijs staat. In December 2022 stuurde Groothuis samen met 50 Europarlementariërs een brief naar President von der Leyen waarin hij waarschuwde voor het bedrijf dat scanners levert voor onder andere luchthavens. De oproep is duidelijk: geen Europees geld mag aan het Chinees staatsbedrijf Nuctech worden besteed voor de vernieuwing van douanecontroleapparatuur op onze grenzen. Het bedrijf vormt een onaanvaardbaar veiligheidsrisico.
Dear President von der Leyen, Dear Commissioner Breton, Dear Commissioner Gentiloni,
We are writing to express our concerns that the EU Customs Control Equipment Instrument (CCEI) of over € 1bn is used to acquire security screening systems from the Chinese state- owned company Nuctech.
Nuctech's rapid expansion in Europe, often through dumping prices, raises concerns about the risks of adopting Chinese technology in our border security systems. The United States, Lithuania and Canada have already banned the company from participating in their government contracts. They concluded that Nuctech’s machines and maintenance can be leveraged for technical and insider spying.1
Using EU funds to further solidify Nuctech’s presence represents a unique opportunity for the company and the Chinese government to gather sensitive customs data that could be detrimental to the commercial and security interests of EU Member States. A contract with Nuctech also means dependency on a risky Chinese state-owned vendor and its personnel for the management, maintenance, system improvements or other technical routine checks of Europe’s border security systems.
The need to secure the protection of data and cyber-resilience is highlighted in Regulation 2021/1077 that approved funding for the CCEI. This is especially crucial for ports and airports, and their ancillary operators, which are considered critical entities under the Critical Entities Directive. This cannot be ensured in the case of Nuctech as it has a direct relationship and legal obligations towards Chinese authorities. When asked, Chinese companies are required to provide data to their intelligence agencies under the Chinese National Intelligence Law.
In view of the upcoming CCEI Coordination Group meeting scheduled for 7 December 2022, we call on you to enforce the admissibility criteria and bar Nuctech from participating in CCEI tenders as it represents an unacceptable security risk. If Member States do not comply, the CCEI should halt further funding.
Undersigned:
François Alfonsi Petras Austrevicius Malik Azmani Gunnar Beck Tiziana Beghin Tom Berendsen Benoît Biteau Saskia Bricmont Reinhard Bütikofer Mohammed Cahim Damien Carême Olivier Chastel David Cormand Katalin Cseh Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield Martina Dlabajová Karima Delli Bas Eickhout Nicolaus Fest GiannaGancia Raphaël Glucksmann Bart Groothuis Christophe Grüdler Claude Gruffat Francisco Guerreiro Valérie Hayer Krzyzstof Hetman Jan Huitema Yannick Jadot Agnes Jongerius Irena Joveva Assita Kanko David Lega
Miriam Lexmann Nathalie Loiseau Emmanuel Maurel Alin Mituța Caroline Nagtegaal Johan Nissinen Mauri Pekkarinen Carles Puigdemont Catharina Rinzema Michèle Rivasi Rob Roos Caroline Roose Bert-Jan Ruissen Mounir Satouri Michal Šimečka Ivan Štefanec Tineke Strik Marie Toussaint Dragoș Tudorache Hilde Vautmans Marie-Pierre Vedrenne Viola von Cramon-Taubadel Lara Wolters
Het antwoord van Ursula von der Leyen:
Dear Honourable Member,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Ursula von der Leyen The President
Thank you and your cosignatories for your letter expressing concern about the security interests ofthe European Union and callingfor a ban on the Chinese company, Nuctech, from participating in tenders under the Customs Control Equipment Instrument (CCEI). The Commission has clarified its position on banning Chinese high-tech products in a
relatedparliamentary question (E-000213/2022).
Member States are responsible for procurement procedures for the purchase, upgrade or maintenance ofthe equipmentfinanced under the Instrument, using thefinancial support provided under the form of CCEI grants. When implementing CCEI grants through purchases or subcontracting, beneficiaries that are ‘contracting authorities/entities’ must comply with the applicable provisions on public procurement, stemming from EU
and national law, including with respect to access to the market conditions.
Let me reassure you that ensuring the security ofthe customs control equipmentfinanced under the CCEI remains of utmost importance, and the Commission has undertaken a number ofsteps in this direction.
The Commission has strongly emphasised that Member States should take all security, data protection, and cybersecurity aspects into consideration by already including relevant provisions in the CCEI grants documentation. Additionally, the Commission provided guidance to the Member States on how to handle these aspects in their national acquisition procedures, underlining that security requirements need to be properly reflected in the procurement selection and award criteria, and that those considerations should prevail over other criteria such as price.
The Commission will also closely monitor and control these aspects throughout the implementation ofthe CCEL The Commission will consider any appropriate measures in theEUlegalframeworktoprotectsecurityandpublicorderofthe UnionanditsMember States in EU award procedures.
Yours faithfully,
Ursula von der Leyen
